Abstract: We propose a clean-slate, holistic approach to the design of secure protocols for wireless ad-hoc networks. We design a protocol that enables a collection of distributed nodes to emerge from a primordial birth and form a functioning network. We define a game between protocols and adversarial nodes, and describe a protocol that is guaranteed to achieve the max-min payoff regardless of what the adversarial nodes do. Moreover, even though the adversarial nodes always know the protocol a priori, we show an even stronger result; the protocol is guaranteed to achieve the min-max payoff. Hence there is a saddle point in the game between protocols and adversarial strategies. Finally, we show that the adversarial nodes are in effect, strategically confined to either jamming or conforming to the protocol. These guarantees are contingent on a set of underlying model assumptions, and cease to be valid if the assumptions are violated.

Bio: Jonathan Ponniah is currently a postdoc at Texas A&M. He completed his doctorate in Electrical Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and his undergraduate and masters studies at the University of Waterloo, Canada. His research interests are in distributed systems, wireless security, network optimization, and network information theory.