This project focuses on analyzing the amount of information gained from an attack called the cache-timing side-channel attack on AES. AES, or the Advanced Encryption Standard, is selected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology to be the block cipher standard. A side-channel cipher attack exploits information which is leaked from a physical implementation of a cipher. In particular, the cache-timing attack measures the time it takes a certain system to complete an encryption. Since the AES cipher uses memory look-ups, which causes cache hits and cache misses, we can use statistical tools to analyze the encryption times taken for different plaintexts to gain information on the encryption key. We want to find a metric to measure the amount of information gained about the key as a function of the number of measurements available. Analysis on this attack may give insight on a way to protect AES from the cache-timing attack or on a way to make the attack more efficient.
Bio updated: Wed Sept. 9th, 2015